Proliferating Madness

From nuclear reprocessing to the persistent mirage of Teller–Reagan impenetrable missile defense

This post shares a nuclear proliferation update by Professor Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (www.NPPP.org) at the University of Texas at Austin.

After Kuperman’s depressing update, you’ll find a summary of the deplorable, multi-year contributions of Rhode Island’s US senator Sheldon Whitehouse to developments that continue to worsen the threat of nuclear proliferation. Although Senator Whitehouse has the highest nuclear-energy profile in the Rhode Island Congressional Delegation, others — present and past — follow him religiously in these matters.

Many of these issues Andie Stewart and I discussed last week in this interview, Atomic Reactions & RI’s Pentagon Keynesians.

Note that in the following, HALEU is a peculiar acronym for “high-assay low-enriched uranium.” In other words: high–low enriched uranium. It refers to nuclear fuel containing roughly 5% to 20% uranium-235 — an enrichment range uncomfortably close to, and partially overlapping with, weapons-usable material. For more on this, see Oliver Stone’s “Nuclear Now” makes no sense.

Note that in the following, HALEU is a peculiar acronym for “high-assay low-enriched uranium”. In other words: high–low enriched uranium. It refers to nuclear fuel containing roughly 5% to 20% uranium-235 — an enrichment range uncomfortably close to, and partially overlapping with, weapons-usable material. For more on this, see Oliver Stone’s “Nuclear Now” makes no sense. Of particular importance are the sections on enrichment effort and global energy inequality.

Here’s Kuperman’s update:

Each year at this time I provide an update from the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project on progress and challenges. Regrettably, this update is the least hopeful since NPPP started in 2008. Recent US policy changes make it increasingly likely that nuclear weapons will spread to additional countries, and even possibly to terrorists, raising the danger they will be used again for the first time since WWII. If you too hope to avoid that outcome, please read on.

President Donald Trump has made these radical changes because he either (1) does not realize how they could lead to proliferation, (2) does not care about that risk, or (3) actually seeks proliferation to reduce US security obligations – neglecting to consider how we could be dragged into resulting nuclear war.

Risky Policies

At least six recent policy changes threaten to increase proliferation risk:

1. Uranium enrichment. The US had opposed spread of this technology for half a century because any facility for peaceful enrichment of reactor fuel could also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. But now the White House is exploring uranium enrichment in at least two countries – Saudi Arabia and South Korea – that previously have expressed desire for nuclear weapons.

2. Reprocessing waste. The US also had opposed this technology for half a century because it enables purification of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Now the White House “supports” South Korea starting to reprocess and is subsidizing US commercialization of this technology by a company seeking to export it “ on a global scale.”

3. “Fast” nuclear reactors. The US also is subsidizing commercial development of this exotic technology that originally was invented to maximize production of weapons-grade plutonium. It makes no sense for nuclear energy, since all prior efforts by countries to commercialize this technology have failed for 50 years – due to exorbitant cost and frequent fires.

4. HALEU fuel. Radically departing from all existing US nuclear powerplants, which use fuel that is unsuitable for weapons, the US government now is promoting HALEU fuel – both for domestic and exported reactors – which scientists warn could readily be used to make bulky but effective nuclear weapons.

5. Online refueling. A traditional barrier to proliferation has been that fuel could not be removed from nuclear power-plants while they were operating, so inspectors could simply focus on refueling operations every year or two during shutdowns. However, the US government now is promoting reactors with online refueling, which enables fuel to be removed at any time, making it hard or impossible to detect diversion.

6. Reduced security. The US government also is seeking to cut costs for smaller reactors by reducing or eliminating defenses against attack, such as exclusion zones and armed guards, which is especially dangerous for plants fueled by HALEU or plutonium – both suitable for nuclear weapons.

A Wiser Path

The responsible growth of nuclear energy requires a more prudent course, based on time-tested policies and technologies. Enrichment should be limited to existing producers, which would not only inhibit proliferation but also reduce costs via economies of scale. Reprocessing should be opposed outright, since all versions enable purification of plutonium for weapons, according to six US national laboratories. Fast reactors should be avoided because they foster proliferation, raise costs, and create unique safety risks. HALEU fuel should be capped below 10 percent enrichment, not the current 20 percent, to block a relatively easy path to the bomb. Online refueling should be avoided so inspectors have a better chance to detect and thereby deter diversions. Security standards should be sustained or upgraded, which would favor bigger reactors that also produce less expensive electricity. In short, the future of nuclear energy should largely resemble its recent past, which could promote security and affordability better than misguided new policies.

Fighting the Good Fight

This year, NPPP and a few others have tried to sound the alarm. In July, I helped organize a letter to Congress from experts including ex-officials under five US presidents, calling for a halt to policies that “could unintentionally threaten the economic viability of nuclear energy and increase risks of nuclear weapons spreading to adversaries.” I also published an article in Scientific American, after the bombing of Iran, arguing that, “It is far preferable to prevent the spread of nuclear-weapon-usable technologies in the first place.”

Regrettably, these sporadic efforts have hardly made a dent against the onslaught of disinformation, campaign contributions, and cronyism from purveyors of bomb-prone nuclear technology. Any hope of success requires a much larger, more coordinated, and better funded campaign – but charitable foundations so far have dismissed such proposals. I intend to keep trying, so please let me know if you can offer suggestions or financial support.

Paul Leventhal Fellows

Finally, a reminder that the NPPP continues to nurture the next generation of nuclear security professionals by awarding an annual Leventhal Fellowship for graduate students that intern at an organization dedicated to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Fellowship is funded entirely by donations, so please consider helping if you can. Details about the latest fellows, and instructions on how to donate, can be found on the Leventhal Fellowship webpage. You are also welcome to contact me directly at AK@NPPP.org.

With best wishes for the holiday season,

Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs
Coordinator, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (www.NPPP.org)
University of Texas at Austin
E-mail: AK@NPPP.org

Understanding at the Nuclear Dawn

Those who built the first nuclear weapons — in my view — understood the physics and the dangers far better than later generations. As at the outset, in today’s multipolar and unstable world, nuclear bombs and civil nuclear power must be treated as inseparable Siamese twins.

The Franck Report appeared in June of 1945. Recall that this was before the Trinity test in July and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of that same year. The report states:

This protection [against nuclear annihilation] can only come from the political organization of the world. Among all arguments calling for an efficient international organization for peace, the existence of nuclear weapons is the most compelling one.

The US blew it on day one — exactly as the Franck Report foresaw:

It may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon as indiscriminate as the [German] rocket bomb and a million times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.

As Bird and Sherwin put it in American Prometheus:

Oppenheimer believed that in the long run, “without world government there could be no permanent peace, that without peace there would be atomic warfare.”

Serious people these days dare not utter “world government”, but words to this effect also appear in the 1946 Acheson–Lilienthal Report:

We are convinced that if the production of fissionable materials by national governments (or by private organizations under their control) is permitted, systems of inspection cannot by themselves be made “effective safeguards... to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.”

Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Senator Whitehouse has long used the halo effect of his status as Rhode Island’s premier climate champion to push nuclear energy.

• He was instrumental in passing nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA) signed into law on September of 2018.

• He has long promoted “reusing spent nuclear fuel”, which means reprocessing — chemically separating spent fuel to extract plutonium and uranium. For more on this see his convoluted 2018 press release.

• Next came the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) signed into law in January of 2019.

• Senator Whitehouse was lead sponsor of the 2024 ADVANCE Act, designed to speed up licensing and deployment of new nuclear reactors, expanding the civilian nuclear infrastructure.

• Most recently, he is a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Nuclear REFUEL Act of 2025, introduced by Senator J. D. Husted (R-OH), “which would smooth the regulatory pathway for recycling used nuclear fuel.” In other words, it would make reprocessing easier.

In sum, it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that Senator Whitehouse has no place in Professor Kuperman’s Non-Proliferation Hall of Fame. All of the above aligns seamlessly with Whitehouse’s broader record: his 2016 support for a law designed to speed up liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and his enduring support for natural-gas projects, pipelines, and related infrastructure.

Of course, people should make up their own minds. But let me once again quote the view of Joseph Rotblat — the one and only scientist who felt morally compelled to walk away from the Manhattan Project. Rotblat understood nuclear physics and spent the rest of his life working tirelessly to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation, as Andrew Brown documented in Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience: The Life and Work of Joseph Rotblat.

Whom do you trust: scientists of Rotblat’s stature or politicians?

Missile Defense and Other Convenient Fictions

A brief note on House of Dynamite. The film hinges on a nuclear weapon slipping through a Golden Dome look-alike — a missile-defense shield whose real-world version succeeds at about coin-toss level. The Pentagon still cites a 100% success rate, courtesy of its orchestrated strapped-down-chicken tests — but a war-economy boondoggle can’t be burdened with such details.

The film also perpetuates the fiction that the president is the sole player “with a hand on the button”. Daniel Ellsberg laid this myth to rest in The Doomsday Machine, where he detailed the actual, loosely connected network of authorization procedures. There is no reason to believe government or military officials’ assurances to the contrary.

This comes at a time when the current US president — like Wilson, Coolidge, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Reagan, and Biden before him — is being propped up to appear compos mentis. I’ve read the House of Dynamite reviews Greg Mitchell cites. None of them mention any of this — and so the filmmakers keep the story simple, with the divinely blessed imperial puppets firmly at center stage.

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Language of the Indispensable Empire (LIE)
MAD (n.): mutual assured destruction — scientific enlightenment’s realization of the Biblical Apocalypse, guaranteed by Murphy’s law to work exactly once